Abstract. This is the first article analyzing the security of SHA-256 against fast collision search which considers the recent attacks by Wang et al. We show the limits of applying techniques known so far to SHA-256. Next we introduce a new type of perturbation vector which circumvents the identified limits. This new technique is then applied to the unmodified SHA-256. Exploiting the combination of Boolean functions and modular addition together with the newly developed technique allows us to derive collision-producing characteristics for step-reduced SHA-256, which was not possible before. Although our results do not threaten the security of SHA-256, we show that the low probability of a single local collision may give rise to a false sense of security.
Introduction
After recent cryptanalytic results on MD5 [20] , SHA-1 [2, 15, 19] and similar hash functions, the resistance of members of the SHA-2 family (i.e. SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) [13] against recent attacks is an important issue.
While SHA-1 and MD5 are currently the most commonly used hash functions worldwide, the direct successor of SHA-1, SHA-256 is in many cases considered to be an upgrade option. However, SHA-256 did not receive as much cryptanalytic scrutiny from the cryptographic community as other hash functions. Even though the underlying design principle did not change since MD4, SHA-256 needs to be considered separately. It is expected to be much stronger than SHA-1, but several questions concerning its collision resistance need to be answered:
-Are the currently known techniques applicable to SHA-256? Which ones and to what extent? -What about new techniques which are specifically designed to be applied to SHA-256?
In this article, we give preliminary answers to these questions. To put our contribution into perspective, we first survey existing approaches and previous results.
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Outline of existing approaches
The basic approach for efficient collision search of the predecessors of SHA-256, SHA-0 and SHA-1, can be described as follows:
1. Identify local collisions in the state-update transformation. 2. Search for low-weight perturbation vectors by searching for low-weight expanded messages. In the approach by Chabaud and Joux [4] the perturbation vectors need to satisfy some additional properties which were dropped later on by Wang et al. [19] by using more complicated techniques. 3. Build the difference vector by interleaving the local collisions as described by the perturbation vector. Note that in [15] and [14] an approach is described which combines the three steps above. 4 . The complexity of the collision search attack is related to the probability with which the characteristic described by these interleaved local collisions is followed. 5. By adjusting message bits for the chosen characteristic and allowing small variations in the characteristic, the computational effort for the collision search is decreased.
Survey of existing results on SHA-256
Being standardized by NIST in 2000 [13] , the first published independent analysis of members of the SHA-2 family was done by Gilbert and Handschuh [6] . They show that there exists a 9-step local collision with probability 2 −66 . Later on, the result was improved by Hawkes et al. [7] . By considering modular differences, they give a new maximal probability of 2 −39 . In [9] SHA-256 is analyzed in encryption mode. Attacks based on related-key assumptions for up to 37 steps are presented there. In [22] , all modular additions are replaced by XOR. For this variant, a search for pseudo-collisions which is faster than brute force search for up to 34 steps faster is described.
In [11] a variant of SHA-256 is analyzed where all Σ and σ are removed. The conclusion is that collisions can be found much faster than by brute force search for this variant. Additionally, some low-weight expanded message differences for a GF(2)-linearized message expansion are given. The work shows that the approach used by Chabaud and Joux [4] in their analysis of SHA-0 is extensible to that particular variant of SHA-256.
Our contribution
So far, nobody described ways to do collision search attacks for the unmodified SHA-256 or step-reduced variants thereof. After a short description of SHA-256 in Sect. 2 To illustrate our point, we define a variant SHA-256-3R, where the shift operation in the message expansion is replaced by a rotation. We show how Next we focus on the unmodified SHA-256. To overcome the limitations we identified before, we introduce the idea to drop the requirement of having a perturbation vector which is a valid expanded message. In Sect. 3.3, we develop a way to derive this new type of perturbation vector for SHA-256, which can be used to find collision-producing characteristics with high probability. The price we have to pay is an increase of the search space for this new type of perturbation vector.
Some heuristics, which were developed in the case of SHA-1 to reduce the search space, do not apply to SHA-256. In Sect. 3.4 we describe a new way to reduce the search space.
As an example, a 19-step collision for unmodified SHA-224 is presented in Sect. 3.5, including a detailed description of the characteristic being used. There are two lessons to be learned from this example. Firstly, compared to independently multiplying probabilities for local collisions, interleaving them dramatically increases their overall probability. This contrasts with observations on older members of the SHA family. Secondly, techniques that exploit the combination of Boolean functions and modular addition in the state update are shown to be applicable in this example of a SHA-224 collision.
Additionally, we briefly survey methods to speed up the collision search for SHA-256 in Sect. 4. These methods and refinements thereof are subsequently used in some examples. These examples include the fast generation of 18-step collisions and 22-step pseudo-collisions with non-zero message difference on a standard PC.
Description of SHA-256
In the remainder of this article we use the notation given in Table 1 . A complete description of SHA-256 can be found in [13] . We briefly review parts of the specification needed subsequently.
SHA-256 is an iterated cryptographic hash function based on a compression function that updates the eight 32-bit state variables A, . 
The i-th step uses a fixed constant K i and the i-th word W i of the expanded message. The message expansion works as follows. An input message is padded and split into 512-bit message blocks. Let ME denote the message expansion function. ME takes as input a vector M with 16 coordinates and outputs a vector W with N coordinates. The coordinates W i of the expanded vector are generated from the initial message M according to the following formula:
Taking a value for N different to 64 results in a step-reduced (or extended) variant of the hash function. The functions σ 0 (x) and σ 1 (x) are defined as follows: Finding collision-producing characteristics for SHA-256 with a high probability is difficult. While searching for high probability characteristics, GF (2)-linear approximations that hold with high probability are useful. In the case of the addition mod 2 32 , bit-wise XOR of the inputs has probability 1 for the LSB and probability 0.5 for all other bits. In the case of the Boolean functions f IF and f M AJ , several approximations are possible which all hold with probability 0.5. Superficially comparing the results in [7] and [6] 1 would lead to the preliminary conclusion that the notion of modular differences instead of XOR differences offers a significant advantage. However, we argue that this is not the case. Using the XOR differences as presented in [6] and looking at possible characteristics for a local collision, we estimate that the probability of a single local collision (depending on the bit position of the perturbation) can be higher than 2 −39 . This is by assuming unknown state variables at the beginning of the local collision. Since this compares favorably with the best results known so far, we will stick to XOR differences..
Compared to SHA-1, where the corresponding probabilities are between 2 −2 and 2 −5 , the probability for a local collision in SHA-256 is still very low. However, we will show by means of an example, that by interleaving several local collisions to build a collision-producing characteristic, the combined probability is much higher than the product of the single probabilities. This effect also occurs in the case of SHA-1 [19], but with much less impact on the overall complexity of the attack. However, before we arrive there, we need to discuss how to find suitable ways for interleaving these local collisions.
Why existing approaches do not work
In this section we discuss to which extent the methods that are used in the analysis of SHA-0 and SHA-1 are applicable to SHA-256 as well. A very highlevel description of the so-called perturbation-correction method to find collisions for SHA-0 and SHA-1 used in [4, 19] could be the following: The message expansion of a hash function is not surjective. We call x a valid expanded message if there exists a value x such that x = ME(x). Additional conditions can be imposed on d in order to ensure that the vectors c u are valid expanded messages. In particular, we need the two following conditions. Condition 1: R r u (ME(d)) needs to be a valid expanded message, for all values r u that occur. Condition 2: T u (ME(d)) needs to be a valid expanded message, for all values u that occur.
It can easily be verified that for the message expansion of SHA-1, Condition 1 is satisfied for all d and for all r u . Condition 2 can be satisfied by ensuring that "the backwards expanded difference equals zero in the first 5 steps" [4] . For the case of SHA-256 with linearized message expansion (all modular additions are replaced by XOR), Condition 2 can easily be satisfied by requiring that the backwards expanded difference equals zero in the first 8 steps. Contrary to SHA-1, satisfying Condition 1 imposes severe restrictions on d.
It has been observed before [14, 15] that the perturbation-correction method imposes overly strict requirements. Indeed, instead of requiring that d and each of the c u are valid expanded messages, it suffices to demand that the sum e = d + u c u is a valid expanded message. For SHA-1, this observation doesn't lead to improved results. However, for SHA-256, it does as we will show in Sect. 3.3.
We show that for SHA-256, Condition 1 cannot always be met by proving the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. For SHA-256, not all perturbation vectors d satisfying Condition 1 lead to a perturbation-correction vector e which is a valid expanded message.
The proof is given in Appendix A and shows first that this holds for a variant of SHA-256 with linearized message expansion and then extends this result to unmodified SHA-256.
The implication of this result is as follows: when we try to extend the standard perturbation-correction method, which is at the core of every analysis of SHA-0 and SHA-1 including those of Wang et al. , to analyze SHA-256, we cannot prevent the fact that there will be unwanted differences due to the message expansion. For later reference, we term them "ghost differences of type 2". Theorem 1 also shows that the additional degrees of freedom we have due to the GF (2) non-linearity of the message expansion are not sufficient to always correct this undesired behavior. In other words, by applying the standard perturbation-correction method, we are facing impossible differentials in the message expansion.
Implications of Theorem 1 on the collision search complexity. The major improvement of Wang et al., which eventually lead to the break of SHA-1, was the ability to deal with a different kind of ghost-difference. By dropping Condition 2, unwanted differences appear in the first 5 steps of SHA-1. We term them "ghost differences of type 1". In the following, we expand on that.
In the case of SHA-1 [19], the (near-)collision-producing characteristic is actually a concatenation of a low-probability general characteristic with a high probability L-characteristic. By means of the general characteristic in the first steps, these "ghost differences of type 1" are incorporated. This general characteristic has a very low probability, but this fact is compensated by message modification, which "bypasses" the probability of the chosen characteristic for more than 20 steps.
What would happen if we drop Condition 2 in the case of SHA-256? The "ghost differences of type 1" as described above will now appear up to step 8. However, starting from step 17 until step N, there will also be "ghost differences of type 2". Even if it would be possible to incorporate them in an even more complex general characteristic covering all N steps, the impact of this approach on the attack complexity would be severe.
The attack complexity is determined by the probability with which the part of the characteristic is followed that is not covered by message modification techniques. Since the low-probability general characteristic needs to be followed for all steps now, message modification cannot prevent its influence on the attack complexity anymore. It is by no means clear that such a general characteristic for all N steps of SHA-256 is even possible. Even if it is, the probability to follow this general characteristic up to step N is likely to be prohibitively low. Therefore, an other approach will be needed.
A short detour: SHA-256-3R
We show that by making a small change in SHA-256, the basic perturbationcorrection approach can be applied again. We name this variant SHA-256-3R and change the message expansion of SHA-256 in the following way: The functions σ 0 (x) and σ 1 (x) are replaced by the following:
SHR is replaced by ROT R which has the effect that Condition 1 imposes no restrictions anymore. Table 2 gives us the starting point for our analysis. It shows a remarkably low-weight perturbation vector which satisfies the following requirements. Firstly, the last 8 perturbation words are all-zero, which means that we can finish all the needed corrections. Secondly, the backwards expansion is all-zero for the first 8 steps which prevents "ghost differences of type 1" in our perturbation-correction vector. These requirements are enough to build a collision-producing characteristic which is constructed by interleaved local collisions as described by the perturbation vector. It is given in Appendix B. Note that this characteristic is an L-characteristic.
Most of the local collisions will be completed within the first 16 steps. The last local collision will be completed at step 27. Due to the small change in the message expansion, we do not have any "ghost differences of type 2". Showing Table 2 . Low-weight expanded message for the XOR-linearized 31-step message expansion of SHA-256 which can be used as a perturbation vector for SHA-256-3R
this fulfills the purpose of this detour, hence we stop the analysis of this Lcharacteristic of SHA-256-3R here.
Extending the Rijmen-Oswald approach to unmodified SHA-256
In the next two subsections, we show that despite the findings in the previous Sect. it is still possible to find perturbation vectors of low-weight which lead to collision-producing characteristics. It will turn out that these perturbation vectors are no longer valid expanded messages by themselves. Thus we will have a new type of perturbation vector for SHA-256. The approach to find such a new type of perturbation vector for SHA-256 is outlined below. The underlying idea is originally proposed in [15] and extended in [14] . Basically, it works as follows. First, we build a linearized version of the message expansion and the state update transformation. Then, we construct a generator matrix G which describes all possible state variables that result in a collision for this linearized version. By searching for low-weight codewords(see [3, 10, 16] ) in the linear code described by G, we are actually searching for L-characteristics with high probability.
In the case of SHA-256, the dimension of G is 512 × (9 * 32 * N ) where N denotes the number of steps. Note that we can cut the parts representing the state variables B, C, D, F, G, H and thus reducing the length of the code without loosing information. However, without a way to reduce the size of the code and not excluding low-weight codewords, a search for L-characteristics with high probability is not feasible.
Reducing the search space to find useful L-characteristics
In the analysis of SHA-1 [2, 8, 15, 19] , it was possible to reduce the search space for perturbation vectors or general collision producing characteristics by applying the following observation. Low-weight expanded messages for SHA-1 have the property that non-zero bits occur in bands, i.e. the non-zero values are concentrated on a few bit positions in every word. This can be explained by the weak avalanche effect of the SHA-1 message expansion. This heuristic does not apply to SHA-256. The functions Σ 0 , Σ 1 , σ 0 and σ 1 effectively prevent such a structure in L-characteristics. Therefore, the search space and hence the size of the code needs to be reduced by other means.
Another way of looking at the search for low-weight codewords in the code describing L-characteristics is as follows. Searching for low-weight codewords maps to searching for low-weight solutions in a homogeneous system of equations in GF (2) . Actually, the corresponding check matrix H of the code described by G is a representation of the coefficients of this system. The variables refer to all message bits and state variable bits in the linearized variant. The system of equations described by H is under-defined, i.e. there are more variables than equations.
Forcing bits to zero or one can also be seen as adding new equations, where we simply set this bit to that particular value. The generator matrix G as described in 3.3 gives us 512 degrees of freedom, which means we can add up to 511 equations to H. By forcing those bits to zero which we expect to be zero in an L-characteristic, we eventually arrive at a system of equations where it is feasible to search for low-weight solutions. Note that this is a rather rough way to reduce the search space which does not work for larger number of steps N .
Example of a collision-producing L-characteristic for 19-step SHA-224
In Table 3 , we give an L-characteristic of a 1-near-collision for 19 steps of SHA-256 which is a 19-step collision for SHA-224 at the same time. Note that the only difference between SHA-224 and SHA-256 is that at the output, the rightmost 32 bits are discarded. By applying the techniques described in Sect.3.4, we reduced the size of the code to 64, which led to our results. The perturbation vector which is used as a building block for this characteristic is the vector A in Table 3 . The perturbation vector is not a valid expanded message. Note that this perturbation vector can be word-wise rotated without loosing its property of leading to a perturbation-correction vector which is always a valid difference between expanded message. Thus, we can rotate our L-characteristic to maximize the number of MSBs involved such that the probability of this L-characteristic is maximized. The first perturbations start at step 5, and there are 23 of them in total. The local collision for SHA-256 as originally described in [6] needs 24 single-bit differences in the message. Using this as an upper bound, we would expect up to 552 single-bit differences in the expanded messages. Note that the actual value 37, the weight of the message difference, is far below this upper bound.
In this particular example, more than 200 conditions on the state variables need to be met to follow the given L-characteristic. Assuming random independent trials, each perturbation would on average contribute a factor of 2
−10
instead of about 2 −40 to the overall probability. Hence, the fact that a single local collision in SHA-256 has a comparatively low probability may give a false feeling of security. Note that the actual collision search complexity can be further reduced by techniques mentioned in Sect. 4. Table 3 . Example of a 19-step SHA-224 collision. All-zero differences are denoted by a single 0 to improve readability 
Adjustments to circumvent impossible characteristics
In this section we take a closer look at the presented L-characteristic. The best probabilities for local collisions are achieved by approximating the differential behavior of the functions f M AJ and f IF by 0. On average, both approximations hold with probability 0.5. However, in certain cases, the probability for this approximation is 0. Translating these properties into the sequence of states of the SHA-256 compression function gives rise to the following observations. A r , A r+1 , A r+2 ) at the same bit position, the chosen linear approximation fails to predict any subsequent difference.
Observation 1 Whenever we have 3 non-zero differences in consecutive variables of the state (

Observation 2 Whenever we have 2 non-zero differences followed by one zero differences in consecutive variables of the state (E r , E r+1 , E r+2 ) at the same bit position, the chosen linear approximation fails to predict any subsequent difference.
In order to prevent these cases, we would need to exclude all of them from our search space. However by doing this, low-weight solutions might be excluded. By using the degrees of freedom we have in our characteristic, i.e. various ways in which differences can propagate through the Boolean functions and the modular addition, we observe the following. It turns out to be possible to circumvent these impossible characteristics by choosing a slightly different characteristic for the same differential. Note that a similar strategy was used in the analysis of SHA-1 [2, 19] .
This suggests that the additional complexity of the SHA-256 state update transformation does not prevent us from using a similar approach. To illustrate this property, we take the 19-step L-characteristic presented in the previous subsection. Indeed, we have a single case of two consecutive words which have a difference at the same bit position. This happens in E 7 and E 8 at bit position 5. Thus Observation 2 applies. The result is that the function f IF accepts (0, 1, 1) as input difference at bit position 5 in step 9. Hence the output of f IF will flip with probability 1.
The easiest way to cancel out this additional difference is by using other differences in the same step. At the output of Σ 1 , we have a difference in bit 4. By a simple carry extension we can produce a change in the carry caused by this difference. The result will be that in contrast to the prediction of our Lcharacteristic, the difference in bit 4 will cause bit 5 to flip as well. However, this additional difference due to the carry extension will now cancel the additional difference at the output of f IF in this step. Eventually, the path described by the L-characteristic can be followed without the need to circumvent additional impossible characteristics.
4 Increasing the performance of collision search for SHA-256
In this section we briefly cover ways to speed up the collision search for members of the SHA-2 family once a suitable characteristic is found. For their predecessors SHA-1 and MD5, two competing approaches can be found in the literature. One approach has been termed message modification. It was first introduced in [17, 20] . A variant of the technique was also used in the most recent analysis of SHA-0 [21] and SHA-1 [18, 19] . The second approach was introduced in [1] and later on applied in [2] . It extends the idea of [5] to the hash function SHA-0. So-called neutral bits in the input message are used to circumvent the probabilistic behavior of the first steps of SHA-0. Within certain limits, both approaches can be extended to the case of SHA-256. Subsequently, we briefly discuss to which extent this is possible.
In the first 16 steps of SHA-256, the conditions on the state variables can be directly rewritten to conditions on the message words. The procedure can be described as follows:
Next, adjust A N +1 and E N +1 accordingly to meet the conditions derived for the characteristic. Then calculate
Note that by applying these formulas, each new message word is calculated twice. Hence it is possible that changes in the message bits contradict each other. In these cases, adjusting message words which are input in the steps before the contradiction occurs is necessary. A high-level algorithm to deal with this issue is given below. Note that such methods were not needed in any of the predecessors of the SHA-2 family, because there can be no contradictions in fulfilling conditions in the first 16 steps.
In order to illustrate the technique, let's assume that by applying the simple message modification rules described by (2) we are getting a contradiction in bit 4 of W 6 . We set this bit such that the condition on state variable E 6 is met (Step 1). In order to fulfill the condition on state variable A 6 (i.e. bit 4 should have opposite value) we simply go back one step and flip bit 4 in W 5 (Step 3). That way, bit 4 in A 5 is flipped. However A 5 is not directly influencing A 6 , but via Σ 0 and the f M AJ -function. The effect is twofold.
-Firstly, depending on the other inputs of the f M AJ -function, the output might not change. In this case, B 5 or C 5 need to be updated by going back and adjusting the input word at the respective step. In general, every message word before the step where the contradiction occurred might be a candidate for message modification. However, the risk that other conditions are affected by these adjustments increases with the number of backward-steps. -Secondly, due to Σ 0 , three other bit positions are also affected with every message word adjustment. These might in turn affect other conditions and might even cancel out the desired effect of the flipped bit at the input via carry propagation.
If it turns out that it cannot be prevented that other conditions are affected with these adjustments, another choice in step 2 needs to be made. To sum up, compared to SHA-1 or MD4/MD5, message modification is more complex due to the fact that two state variables are updated at the same time. After step 16, chances that existing conditions are affected by message modification increase. In the Appendices C and D we show simple examples of the application of these techniques. Table 4 summarizes them.
Conclusions and future work
When the attack techniques that were used successfully against SHA-1, are applied to SHA-256, several problems arise. Firstly, the shift operations in the message expansion of SHA-256 severely limit the usefulness of the perturbationcorrection approach. To circumvent this obstacle, we introduced a new type of perturbation vector. We showed that it is still possible to find low-weight difference vectors that may result in a collision, but the search space increases dramatically. In order to find collisions for versions with more than 20 steps, we need new heuristics to reduce the search space. Secondly, the increased Hamming weight of the difference and the presence of two nonlinear Boolean functions in each step make it very difficult to avoid consecutive ones in the inputs of the Boolean functions. Hence we have to deal with the fact that the linear approximations for these functions often won't hold. We have presented some ideas on how to deal with this problem.
Thirdly, the very low probability for one local collision in SHA-256 may give rise to a false feeling of security. We have shown with examples that the interleaving of local collisions results in many canceled differences. Hence the probability of n interleaved local collisions is typically significantly larger than the probability of one local collision, raised to the power n. We need to develop better ways of estimating this probability. 
A Proof of Theorem 1
Before proofing Theorem 1, we need the following Observation. 
the following relation must hold:
Now we can give a constructive proof for Theorem 1.
Proof. Let's first consider the case of a GF(2)-linearized variant of M E, M E lin . In order to proof Theorem 1 for this variant, it suffices to show that for a particular d, the vector e is not a valid expanded message.
We choose d to be the perturbation vector shown in Table 2 we
Now we apply Observation 3 and see that we get the following contradiction at bit-position 32(MSB). We have V 31 = X 31 = Y 31 = Z 31 = R 31 = 0, thus we require V 32 ⊕ X 32 ⊕ Y 32 ⊕ Z 32 ⊕ R 32 = 0 which is not the case. Thus we have shown that even by using the additional degrees of freedom in the message expansion(i.e. the carry effect), we can never arrive at the desired difference 1b022000 in W 17 .
B L-characteristic for a 31-step collision of SHA-256-3R
The L-characteristic for 31-step SHA-256-3R including the message difference used in Sect. 3.2 is given in Table 5 . Table 5 . L-characteristic for a 31-step collision in SHA-256-3R
Step In Table 7 we give an example of an 18-step collision for SHA-256 2 . We used a combination of the message modification technique described in Sect. 4 and the search for neutral bits to -find the first 18-step collision in much less than a minute -generate millions of them by using a large set of 2-neutral bits The L-characteristic for this 18-step collision in SHA-256 including the message difference is given in Table 6 . Since there are no conditions on the IVs, every IV including the standard-IV can be used. By adding more steps to this characteristic, near-collisions for more than 18-step can be derived in a straightforward manner. Note however that the weight of the difference at the output will be higher than one, thus a 1-near-collision as presented in Sect. 3.5 cannot be derived that way. Table 6 . L-characteristic of an 18-step collision in SHA-256
Step Table 7 . Example of an 18-step collision using the standard IV i Mi 1-8 16853745 18e6df8c 120fb442 2518ce3c 275402ad ca155872 46e8728b 88ba2899 9-16 071bf5a8 00b39aef 144b19e2 1a533554 2d53445e 02e6a5db 018663c5 05fcb47b D Pseudo-near-collisions for the compression function of SHA-256
We give an example of a pseudo-near-collision for the compression function of step-reduced SHA-256. The attacker has more freedom in such a setting: In
